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Abstract
In this paper the relation between religion and income is investigated using a micro-dataset for
the Netherlands. Religion is measured by religious membership and by participation. Instead
of estimating a religion equation and an income equation separately, joint regression is preferred
since this generally yields more eﬃcient estimates. Following the single-equation approach,
both religious measures are found to decrease income significantly and income is found to aﬀect
religion negatively. However, these cross-eﬀects become insignificant once the equations are
estimated simultaneously. In contrast, the eﬀects of socio-economic characteristics on religion
and income hardly diﬀer between the approaches.
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I Introduction
Weber (1930) initiated a still lively discussion about the relation between religion and income.
He argued that the Protestant, and especially Calvinistic, religion stimulated rational capitalism,
resulting in a higher level of income for countries with a larger share of Protestants. This stimulus
found its origin in the Protestant belief that work is a ‘calling’. Fulfilment of the obligations to
reap the fruits hidden in the created world, not asceticism, drives Protestants, in Weber’s view.
However, the evidence for this thesis is weak and alternative theories have emerged on how income
is aﬀected by religiousness.1
An alternative explanation for a positive eﬀect stresses that a higher church attendance might
expand social capital when churches are in fact civic organizations (Sacerdote and Glaeser, 2001).
Network and interaction eﬀects might in this case lead to more opportunities resulting in a higher
level of income.2
According to Barro and McCleary (2003), belief is the crucial factor influencing income. In this
view, church attendance increases income mainly through strengthening religious beliefs. However,
a higher input to the religion sector (i.e. church attendance), while keeping the output (i.e. beliefs)
constant, would then result in a negative eﬀect on income as fewer resources are available for
productive activities (see also Azzi and Ehrenberg, 1975).
Furthermore, religion might reduce the utility derived from income. If a religion stresses the value
of ‘good works’, like the Roman Catholic religion for example, the value of income is reduced.3
This theory would also predict a lower level of income for religious people.
Given the diﬀerent arguments, the eﬀect of religion on income is undetermined. Empirical analysis
is necessary to test which eﬀects dominate. The empirical literature on income eﬀects of religion
1See Iannaccone (1998) for a thorough introduction to the economics of religion.
2Gruber (2005) shows with US micro-data that both religious participation and income are higher when a larger
share of the local population is of an individual’s religion.
3Lelkes (2006) shows with micro-data for Hungary that income is a less important source of happiness for people
who are actively involved in religious activities.
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is summarized in Table 1.4 Almost all studies focus on the diﬀerences in eﬀect between denomin-
ations (Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, etc.). Crain and Lee (1999) and Lipford and Tollison (2003),
however, analyze the eﬀect of church membership without distinguishing denominations. With
the exception of Steen (1996), only recently has the participation eﬀect of religious behavior been
empirically tested (Cornwell et al., 2003, Barro and McCleary, 2003 and Mangeloja, 2005). Until
the cross-country studies of Barro and McCleary (2003) and Mangeloja (2005), all results were
based on data for Canada and the USA. The results are always positive for the Jewish belief. More
mixed results are found for other denominations and for participation. Interestingly, Mangeloja
(2005) also presents estimations with time series for eight OECD countries. He finds that the eﬀect
of religion on income growth is not consistent between countries. While he finds an insignificant
eﬀect of religion on income growth for five countries, other countries show a negative or positive
eﬀect.
A second strand of the literature analyzes the reverse relation, i.e. the eﬀect of income (and other
socio-economic characteristics) on religion. According to Iannaccone (1998) this literature finds a
strong positive relation between income and financial contributions to churches, but often a weak
relation with other religious variables (attendance, membership, frequency of prayer and beliefs).
Sawkins et al. (1997), for instance, find an insignificant relationship between non-labor income and
church attendance using micro-data for Great Britain. The coeﬃcients for labor earnings variables,
however, imply higher church attendance for middle-income earners.
Although these two types of analyses suggest that there might be a bicausal relationship between
religion and income, most studies ignore the endogeneity of religion. As long as the role of endogen-
eity is unclear, the general conclusions of the literature can be questioned, as neglect of endogeneity
might result in biased estimations. One exception is Lipford and Tollison (2003). They estimate
a system of equations to account for the eﬀect of church membership on income but also for the
reverse eﬀect. They find that not only the estimated eﬀect of church membership on income is
4Other eﬀects are also analyzed in the literature such as eﬀects on mental and physical health, crime and divorce.
See Iannaccone (1998) for an excellent overview.
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Table 1: Literature income and religion
No. Country Level of data Measure of religion Eﬀect on income
1. USA Micro: men Membership Positive (Jewish)
2. Canada Micro: men Membership Insignificant (within memberships)
3. Canada Micro: men Membership Positive (Jewish)
Insignificant (Protestants vs. Catholics)
4. USA Micro: men Membership Positive (Jewish)
5. USA State Membership Positive (Jewish)
Insignificant (liberal Protestant)
Negative (Catholic and orthodox
Protestant)
6. USA Micro: Men Membership Positive (Jewish and Catholic)
Insignificant (Protestants)
Participation Negative (Protestants)
Insignificant (other memberships)
7. USA State Membership Insignificant
8. USA State Membership Negative
9. USA Micro: women Membership Insignificant (on pay per hour)
Participation Positive (on hours worked)
10. Several (max. 58) Country Membership Negative
Participation Negative
Beliefs Positive
11. Eight OECD Country Participation Positive (1 country)
Negative (2 countries)
Insignificant (5 countries)
Beliefs Positive (2 countries)
Negative (1 country)
Insignificant (5 countries)
1. Chiswick (1983), 2. Tomes (1984), 3. Tomes (1985), 4. Chiswick (1993), 5. Heath et al. (1995),
6. Steen (1996), 7. Crain and Lee (1999), 8. Lipford and Tollison (2003), 9. Cornwell et al. (2003),
10. Barro and McCleary (2003), 11. Mangeloja (2005).
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negative, but also the eﬀect of income on church membership. Furthermore, the estimate of the
former eﬀect is twice that with single-equation estimation.
Barro and McCleary (2003) also take the endogeneity issue seriously.5 They account for this
problem by using instrumental variables in a three-stage least squares estimation. Again they find
that endogeneity is important and that correcting for this problem results in larger coeﬃcients
with the same sign. They find that religion influences income growth negatively when measured
by church attendance and positively when measured by beliefs (in hell and heaven).
While Lipford and Tollison (2003) use a state-level database with 153 observations for the USA,
Barro and McCleary (2003) use a panel database with 181 observations for 59 countries. This
paper analyzes a micro-dataset for the Netherlands with observations for 27,908 households. We
find that whether we estimate the income and the religion equations separately or simultaneously
matters for the results. While religiousness is found to reduce income significantly when single
equations are estimated, joint estimation results in an insignificant eﬀect.6
The contribution to the literature of this paper is threefold. First, we estimate the bicausal relation
between religion and income for the Netherlands while the literature is dominated by results for the
USA and Canada. Second, our dataset allows us to discriminate between the eﬀects of religious
membership and of religious participation. Third, we show with micro-data that the equations
should be estimated jointly to explain the relation between religion and income.
The next two sections discuss the estimation methodology and the data. Section IV describes the
estimation results. The last section concludes.
5See also McCleary and Barro (2006).
6Notice that even in the absence of a serious endogeneity problem, system estimation yields generally more
eﬃcient estimates by using the correlation of the disturbance terms.
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II Methodology
We start by estimating the relation between religion measured by church membership and income.
As both variables are measured as discrete variables, a probit estimator is applied. Membership
is denoted by the dummy y1i with the value 1 if household i is a member of a church. As income
is available only in deciles,7 y2i denotes the after-tax income class of household i. The system of
structural equations is expressed in terms of the latent variables. This specification assumes that
households have complete flexibility in their decisions but that the researcher can only observe
the choices as discrete variables (see Blundell and Smith, 1994).8 The structural model written in
terms of the latent variables (y∗1 and y
∗
2) and vectors of socio-economic control variables (x1 and
x2) is:
y∗1i = α1y
∗
2i + β
0
1x1i + u1i y1i = 1 if y∗1i > 0, = 0 otherwise
y∗2i = α2y
∗
1i + β
0
2x2i + u2i y2i = j if μj−1 < y
∗
2i ≤ μj j = 1, ., J
(II.1)
The second equation contains J+1 cutoﬀs μj . Assuming that y∗2 has an infinite support yields that
μ0 = −∞ and μJ = ∞. Since x2 includes a constant, μ1 = 0 has to be imposed. The remaining
J − 2 cutoﬀs are estimated.
Model (II.1) cannot be directly estimated since it contains non-observables on the right-hand side.
Therefore, the reduced form equations are derived as, with D ≡ (1− α1α2),
y∗1i = β¯
0
1xi + v1i β¯
0
1xi =
¡
β01x1i + α1β
0
2x2i
¢
/D v1i = (u1i + α1u2i) /D
y∗2i = β¯
0
2xi + v2i β¯
0
2xi =
¡
α2β01x1i + β
0
2x2i
¢
/D v2i = (α2u1i + u2i) /D
(II.2)
where xi = x1i∪x2i. A variable that occurs in both structural equations thus has a coeﬃcient equal
to (β1 + α1β2) /D and (α2β1 + β2) /D in the reduced form equations, respectively. Identification
7Statistics Netherlands calculates deciles from the original level of data for privacy reasons.
8Maddala (1983, p. 124) interprets a latent variable as a measure of intentions. Blundell and Smith (1994)
consider a class of structural models that are simultaneous in the observed dependent variables. As a consequence,
the reduced form cannot be derived explicitly and extra coherency restrictions have to be imposed.
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of the structural coeﬃcients requires that x1 contains at least one variable that is not included in x2
and vice versa. The reduced form disturbances vk are assumed to have a joint normal distribution
with means 0, variances 1, and covariance ρ.9 To compare the results of the system estimation,
we also apply a probit regression to each equation separately. The single equations are specified
similarly to (II.1), where the latent variable y∗k on the right-hand side is replaced by the observed
yk.10 The estimation procedure is explained in Appendix A.
In the estimation of a second system, religiousness is measured by church attendance. The binary
y1 is replaced by a dummy with the value 1 if the household attends church services at least
once a week. The vector of control variables (x) in this system contains dummies indicating the
denomination to which the respondent belongs. One could argue that the choice of denomination
should also be treated as an endogenous decision. However, this last option implies in our case
simultaneous estimation of three equations (two ordered probits for income and denomination
membership and one probit for participation). As this clearly results in econometric complexities,
simplification is desirable.
This is motivated by the intuitive observation that endogeneity is a more serious problem with
participation than with membership choice, as most people stick to the church membership they
are born with, while participation is changed far more often. Indeed, Tomes (1984) shows that
more than 75% of Canadians keep the religion they are raised in (this figure is 86% for Protestants
and 81% for Catholics). In contrast, a majority of the people that are not raised in a religion
become members of a church later on (53%). Figures for the Netherlands are in accordance with
this observation (Becker and De Wit, 2000).11 While membership did not change much between
1991 (43%) and 1999 (37%), religious participation (defined as the share of members attending
services at least once a week) decreased by 26%. This was especially the case for Roman Catholics,
9This implies that the structural disturbances uk = vk − αkvk0 (k 6= k0) are normally distributed with means 0,
variances (1 + α2k − 2αkρ) and covariance (1 + α1α2) ρ− α1 − α2.
10Note that the rejection of the hypothesis ρ = 0 means that system estimation is preferred to single-equation
regressions.
11Our dataset contains no information about the religion in which a person was raised.
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for whom this share decreased by 53% to a level of 14% in 1999.12
It should be noted that one can doubt the quality of the answers on the membership question
because oﬃcial but inactive members, who make up a large part of total members, might answer
this question arbitrarily with yes or no. Answers on questions about participation are considered
to be more precise. We therefore believe that the participation variable is a more reliable measure
of religiousness.
III Data
Data are from 2000 for 27,908 Dutch households. These data are based on a survey of Statistics
Netherlands (CBS), which gives, according to the CBS, a reliable picture of the total Dutch pop-
ulation. In this survey households are questioned about socio-economic characteristics (such as
age, education level and composition of households), the level of after-tax household income13 and
church membership.
The income tax is in principle levied on individual income. However, fiscal partners can transfer
joint income components between them for their tax return. Benefits that are means tested are
based on household income.14 Specific church taxes are not levied in the Netherlands. Tax refunds
arising from contributions to churches are not included in our income concept.
Households can choose between no membership of a denomination or membership of the following
denominations: Roman Catholic, two types of Protestants (Reformed and ‘Gereformeerd’), Islam
and non-specified other denominations.15 Furthermore, members of a denomination are asked
how many times per year they attend a service of that denomination. Membership and frequency
12This is in line with the conclusion of Iannaccone (1998, p. 1470) that the empirical literature shows that for
religious membership, ‘income or wage eﬀects are almost always dwarfed by those of age, gender, and religious
upbringing.’
13We have no information on the wage rate or hours of work.
14Detailed information can be found in De Mooij (2006, Section 3.4) and on the Ministry of Finance website
(www.minfin.nl/en/subjects,taxation/income-tax).
15The Reformed Church and the ‘Gereformeerde’ Church are both Protestant churches. Although they are alike
in some respects, the diﬀerences are large in others. Tests show that it is not appropriate to combine them in
one Protestant dummy (orthodox Protestants are included in the dummy for the Reformed Church). Reformed
households are taken as benchmark in the estimation, so the dummy for this religion is excluded.
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of attendance are unfortunately not reported for individual family members, but only for the
respondent (always an adult). This study therefore focuses on the question of whether household
income is diﬀerent when at least the respondent is religious. Ideally, we would need information on
the religious behavior of all household members, but these data are not available. In our opinion
this limitation is not crucial for our estimations as homogeneous religiousness within households is
still the rule, especially for membership. Kalmijn (1998) concludes on the basis of several studies
for western countries that both Catholics and Protestants have a tendency to marry within rather
than outside their group. Hendrickx (1998) confirms this for the Netherlands.
Our estimations are based on two diﬀerent datasets (Table 2). The full dataset (27,908 observa-
tions) is used to estimate the system with membership as endogenous variable. As here religion is
defined as membership of a church, we include observations for church members (16,758) as well
as for non-church members (11,150). These latter observations are excluded in the second system
estimation, with participation as endogenous variable, as non-church members have zero parti-
cipation by definition. Since the non-church-member dummy would be perfectly correlated with
participation (=0), estimation of the corresponding coeﬃcient in the first equation is impossible.
Estimation of the income equation would suﬀer from multicollinearity for the same reason.
In total 16,758 respondents are members of some denomination (see Table 3). This is 60% of all
households, which is comparable to the figure for the USA according to Iannaccone (1994). Roman
Catholic membership applies for 52% of all members, while 36% are members of a Protestant
church. Finally, 4% are members of the Islamic faith and 9% of some non-specified denomination.
Comparing the number of church members who seldom or never attend services (7,366) with total
membership of denominations makes it clear that many members are not religiously active. While
this comprises 44% of total church members, the diﬀerences between denominations are large,
with members of the Roman Catholic, Reformed and Islamic denominations having the lowest
participation levels. Only 21% of church members attend a church service often (once or more per
week). This is somewhat lower than in Canada and much lower than in the USA, according to
9
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: income and socio-economic characteristics
Sample members Full sample
Ave. St. dev. Max. Min. Ave. St. dev. Max. Min.
Income (decile) 5.43 2.81 10 1 5.57 2.84 10 1
MemberCatholic 0.52 0.50 1 0 0.31 0.46 1 0
MemberReformed 0.24 0.42 1 0 0.14 0.35 1 0
MemberGereformeerd 0.12 0.32 1 0 0.08 0.25 1 0
MemberIslam 0.04 0.20 1 0 0.02 0.15 1 0
MemberOther 0.09 0.28 1 0 0.05 0.22 1 0
Age 49.42 15.35 85 15 47.57 14.97 85 15
Male 0.82 0.38 1 0 0.81 0.39 1 0
Household size 2.91 1.38 6 1 2.86 1.34 6 1
Child<4 years 0.16 0.37 1 0 0.17 0.37 1 0
Child4−12 years 0.16 0.36 1 0 0.16 0.37 1 0
Child12−18 years 0.11 0.31 1 0 0.10 0.31 1 0
Single-adult household 0.18 0.38 1 0 0.19 0.39 1 0
Educationlow 0.06 0.24 1 0 0.06 0.24 1 0
Educationmid 0.34 0.47 1 0 0.34 0.47 1 0
Educationhigh 0.22 0.41 1 0 0.25 0.43 1 0
Dutch 0.97 0.18 1 0 0.97 0.16 1 0
Surface per inhabitant 3.25 1.25 5 1 3.08 1.29 5 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistics: number of denomination members
Participation: minimum number of services attended per year
Membership All 52 24 12 < 12 ≈ 0
Roman Catholic 8,655 882 641 1,043 1,979 4,110
Reformed 4,041 860 376 287 502 2,016
‘Gereformeerd’ 1,944 951 259 134 167 433
Islam 678 212 35 35 78 318
Other 1,440 608 131 74 138 489
Total 16,758 3,513 1,442 1,573 2,864 7,366
10
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Iannaccone et al. (1997). Countries such as Switzerland, Australia, Germany, New Zealand and
the UK have a somewhat lower attendance rate, while Scandinavian countries especially have a
very low religious participation rate (less than 10%). In our estimations the participation dummy
is based on the category of church visits of at least once per week. Our results do not depend
on this definition. When participation is defined as church attendance at least twice per month,
results are comparable. In another alternative, we treat households that never attend services as
non-church members. This reclassification also hardly aﬀects our conclusions.16
Table 4 gives more information about the income deciles. Although we only have information
on which decile households are in, average and maximum decile figures in euros are available.
The average income for our sample is 24,800 euro per year. The distribution of households over
the deciles is quite equal with a minimum of 2,508 and a maximum of 2,872 households per
decile. The table also shows the number of non-church-member households per decile (column
with Membership=0) and the number of households that are church members (Membership=1),
divided into members who participate less than once a week (Part=0) and members who participate
at least once a week (Part=1).
Data are available for the most important socio-economic characteristics (see Appendix B for
definitions). For most characteristics information is expressed as a dummy variable. Exceptions
are age (available for the breadwinner and included in years and its square), household size (the
number of persons in the household)17 and surface per inhabitant (ordered variable with value 1 for
a densely populated area and 5 for a sparsely populated country village). Dummies are available
for four types of family composition (benchmark is households with two adults and no children
under 18 years old), for four education levels (benchmark is households with an education level
less than low) and for the breadwinner being of Dutch nationality (benchmark is households with
breadwinner not of Dutch nationality).
16Results for both sensitivity analyses are available on request and are also included in Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf
(2005).
17 Statistics Netherlands does not report data for households consisting of more than 6 persons for privacy reasons.
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Table 4: Income deciles
Number of households Income in euros per year
Income Membership=1 Member-
decile Part=1 Part=0 ship=0 Total Average Maximum
1 357 1,137 1,014 2,508 4,900 10,000
2 465 1,315 897 2,677 11,500 12,900
3 502 1,296 1,018 2,816 14,300 15,700
4 416 1,348 1,082 2,846 17,100 18,700
5 386 1,372 1,095 2,853 20,500 22,200
6 320 1,397 1,155 2,872 24,100 25,900
7 308 1,386 1,178 2,872 27,900 29,900
8 276 1,408 1,150 2,834 32,400 35,100
9 275 1,309 1,252 2,836 38,700 43,200
10 208 1,277 1,309 2,794 56,500 na
Total 3,513 13,245 11,150 27,908
IV Results
First we discuss the estimation results for the bicausal relation between religious membership and
income. The second subsection presents the results for religious participation. The third subsection
discusses results for the socio-economic characteristics.
IV.1 Membership and income
Table 5 presents the estimation results for religion defined as membership of a denomination. In
panel A the results are given for the membership equation, while in panel B the results are shown for
the income equation. Columns two and three present the structural coeﬃcients and the standard
errors, while the fourth column gives marginal eﬀects.18 The system results can be compared with
the results for the single-equation estimations, presented in the last two columns. The choice of the
identifying restrictions is motivated by the single-equation results. In the system estimation, the
Male dummy is excluded from the membership equation, while the Child12−18 dummy is dropped
18Marginal eﬀects on income are calculated in euros using the average income per decile from Table 4 and expressed
as a % of the sample average income. The marginal eﬀects of age are multiplied by its standard deviation (=15)
for a better scaling. See Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2005) for details on the computation and for individual decile
eﬀects. These results are also available on request.
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from the income equation.19
A first finding is that ρ is significant (at 1%).20 The results of the system estimation are there-
fore preferred to the single-equation estimations. The single-equation approach results in highly
significant, negative cross-eﬀects between membership and income. The significant bicausal rela-
tion is no longer found with the more eﬃcient simultaneous estimation. The structural estimates
show that for given socio-economic variables income has no eﬀect on membership. The negative
coeﬃcient in the single membership equation incorrectly identifies part of the non-income eﬀects
as pure income eﬀects. A similar interpretation holds for the income equation. The rejection of
bicausality might suggest that system estimation is not required. However, system estimation still
yields more eﬃcient estimates than single-equation estimation since it accounts for the correlation
between the disturbance terms of both equations.
In contrast, Lipford and Tollison (2003) found that system estimation did not change the significant,
negative eﬀect of income on membership, but that the negative coeﬃcient for the opposite eﬀect
doubled. The negative relation between membership and income in both directions is not found
in our dataset.
IV.2 Participation and income
Table 6 presents the estimation results for religious participation. The identifying restrictions are
the same as in the first system (with membership as religious measure). Again, ρ is significant.
With single-equation estimation, both the coeﬃcient for the eﬀect of income on participation and
the coeﬃcient for the opposite eﬀect are significantly negative. However, estimating a system again
yields insignificant cross-eﬀects, suggesting that households who attend church services frequently
do not have a significantly lower income. Concerning the reverse eﬀect, Iannaccone (1998) reports
that most studies find that income is a weak predictor of church attendance.
19Sensitivity analyses with other restrictions show that our main conclusions do not depend on this choice.
Alternative identifying restrictions are motivated by the significance level or the magnitude of marginal eﬀects in
the single-equation estimation. Results are available upon request.
20For both the membership and participation estimations this result is confirmed by a log likelihood ratio test.
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Table 5: Estimation results: religious membership
Structural System Single
Coeﬀ. St. error Marg.1 Coeﬀ. St. error
A. Membership
Income 0.245 (0.548) 8.99 -0.015∗∗∗ (0.003)
Age -0.032 (0.039) 6.25 -0.012∗∗∗ (0.004)
Age2 (*1000) 0.463 (0.411) 0.257∗∗∗ (0.036)
Male (-) (-) 0.012 (0.024)
Household size 0.174∗∗∗ (0.042) 6.21 0.153∗∗∗ (0.012)
Child<4 years -0.156∗∗∗ (0.053) -5.65 -0.135∗∗∗ (0.032)
Child4−12 years -0.270∗∗∗ (0.065) -9.84 -0.242∗∗∗ (0.033)
Child12−18 years -0.193∗∗∗ (0.036) -7.03 -0.200∗∗∗ (0.033)
Single-adult household 0.407 (0.701) 13.50 0.056∗ (0.029)
Educationlow -0.169 (0.189) -6.08 -0.073∗∗ (0.034)
Educationmid -0.172 (0.253) -6.19 -0.043∗∗ (0.020)
Educationhigh -0.445 (0.569) -16.47 -0.154∗∗∗ (0.022)
Dutch -0.710∗∗∗ (0.175) -22.62 -0.625∗∗∗ (0.053)
Surface per inhabitant 0.152∗∗∗ (0.006) 5.45 0.153∗∗∗ (0.006)
B. Income
Membership 0.117 (0.120) 5.20 -0.058∗∗∗ (0.013)
Age 0.071∗∗∗ (0.004) -1.00 0.070∗∗∗ (0.003)
Age2 (*1000) -0.777∗∗∗ (0.046) -0.739∗∗∗ (0.028)
Male 0.042∗∗ (0.018) 1.88 0.044∗∗ (0.019)
Household size -0.092∗∗∗ (0.016) -4.02 -0.070∗∗∗ (0.009)
Child<4 years 0.093∗∗∗ (0.023) 4.43 0.074∗∗∗ (0.025)
Child4−12 years 0.132∗∗∗ (0.026) 6.29 0.098∗∗∗ (0.026)
Child12−18 years (-) (-) -0.027 (0.026)
Single-adult household -1.268∗∗∗ (0.023) -49.82 -1.255∗∗∗ (0.022)
Educationlow 0.353∗∗∗ (0.029) 14.67 0.341∗∗∗ (0.027)
Educationmid 0.467∗∗∗ (0.017) 19.78 0.459∗∗∗ (0.015)
Educationhigh 1.061∗∗∗ (0.028) 48.56 1.035∗∗∗ (0.017)
Dutch 0.379∗∗∗ (0.085) 16.06 0.292∗∗∗ (0.039)
Surface per inhabitant -0.016 (0.019) -0.69 0.005 (0.005)
Rho -0.036∗∗∗ (0.008) 0
Log L -76,675 -76,665
Observations 27,908 27,908
1. Marginal eﬀects in %-point change of base value for Membership (60.34%) and
% change of base value for Income (24.8 thousand euro). Quadratic and linear
eﬀect of age are combined in one marginal eﬀect.
Coeﬃcients with */**/*** are significant at the 10%/5%/1% level.
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Interestingly, we find an eﬀect of Islamic membership on income after controlling for religious
participation. Compared with the benchmark (a Reformed household), Islamic households have
less income (-25%). This eﬀect is in accordance with results found by Barro and McCleary (2003),
although our eﬀects are much larger. It should be kept in mind that part of this large eﬀect probably
has to do with the specific labor market position of persons coming from Islamic countries.21
The insignificant eﬀect of Catholic membership on income is in line with Cornwell et al. (2003).
However, Heath et al. (1995) found a negative eﬀect and Steen (1996) found a positive eﬀect for
this variable.
Summarizing, our analysis shows that estimating a single equation may lead to erroneous con-
clusions about the eﬀect of religion on income. Clearly, the conclusions of Lipford and Tollison
(2003) and Barro and McCleary (2003) cannot be confirmed for our data as in their cases the ef-
fect remains significantly negative after correcting for endogeneity. The significant eﬀects found in
Cornwell et al. (2003) and Steen (1996) might be misleading since they follow the single-equation
approach. Our results are more in line with Mangeloja (2005) as he finds insignificant eﬀects for
five out of eight countries using country-level data. The eﬀect of religion on income probably diﬀers
between countries, making cross-country analysis a troublesome route to follow.
IV.3 Eﬀects of socio-economic characteristics
In contrast to the former findings, system estimation hardly aﬀects the coeﬃcients representing the
eﬀects of socio-economic characteristics. This is illustrated by way of the marginal eﬀects calculated
for the case with religious participation (Figures 1 and 2).22 Two features can be observed. First,
the marginal eﬀects obtained for the structural system hardly diﬀer from the ones for the reduced
system (if the corresponding coeﬃcient is significantly estimated). In other words, the direct eﬀect
of the socio-economic characteristics dominates the indirect eﬀects for both endogenous variables.
21 Sensitivity analysis shows that all conclusions are robust when data from Islamic members are excluded. Results
are available on request.
22 See Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2005) for details on the computation and for detailed eﬀects. These results are
also available on request.
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Table 6: Estimation results: participation (once or more per week)
Structural System Single
Coeﬀ. St. error Marg.1 Coeﬀ. St. error
A. Participation
Income 1.475 (1.859) 35.51 -0.030∗∗∗ (0.005)
MemberCatholic -0.450∗∗∗ (0.045) -9.20 -0.440∗∗∗ (0.030)
MemberGereformeerd 0.908∗∗∗ (0.095) 29.54 0.846∗∗∗ (0.037)
MemberIslam 1.393 (1.111) 47.04 0.473∗∗∗ (0.067)
MemberOther 0.971∗∗∗ (0.306) 31.87 0.726∗∗∗ (0.042)
Age -0.106 (0.105) 12.89 -0.019∗∗∗ (0.006)
Age2 (*1000) 1.348 (1.161) 0.393∗∗∗ (0.052)
Male (-) (-) 0.046 (0.041)
Household size 0.256∗∗∗ (0.094) 6.67 0.181∗∗∗ (0.016)
Child<4 years -0.215 (0.149) -4.35 -0.110∗∗ (0.054)
Child4−12 years -0.351∗∗ (0.160) -6.76 -0.234∗∗∗ (0.053)
Child12−18 years -0.179∗∗ (0.077) -3.67 -0.199∗∗∗ (0.051)
Single-adult household 1.927 (2.224) 52.58 0.112∗∗ (0.046)
Educationlow -0.467 (0.581) -12.73 0.014 (0.051)
Educationmid -0.671 (0.849) -17.48 0.032 (0.030)
Educationhigh -1.573 (1.943) -31.74 0.039 (0.036)
Dutch -0.277 (0.250) -7.23 -0.085 (0.070)
Surface per inhabitant 0.075∗ (0.039) 1.85 0.045∗∗∗ (0.010)
B. Income
Part 0.068 (0.156) 2.95 -0.109∗∗∗ (0.021)
MemberCatholic 0.037 (0.071) 1.62 -0.003 (0.020)
MemberGereformeerd -0.099 (0.135) -4.28 -0.010 (0.029)
MemberIslam -0.631∗∗∗ (0.095) -25.21 -0.581∗∗∗ (0.050)
MemberOther -0.210∗ (0.119) -8.94 -0.135∗∗∗ (0.032)
Age 0.058∗∗∗ (0.005) -3.38 0.055∗∗∗ (0.004)
Age2 (*1000) -0.651∗∗∗ (0.079) -0.607∗∗∗ (0.036)
Male 0.027 (0.026) 1.17 0.032 (0.026)
Household size -0.062∗∗ (0.024) -2.65 -0.044∗∗∗ (0.011)
Child<4 years 0.077∗∗ (0.030) 3.57 0.067∗∗ (0.034)
Child4−12 years 0.093∗∗∗ (0.034) 4.30 0.071∗∗ (0.034)
Child12−18 years (-) (-) -0.019 (0.034)
Single-adult household -1.192∗∗∗ (0.039) -45.65 -1.175∗∗∗ (0.030)
Educationlow 0.312∗∗∗ (0.035) 12.67 0.311∗∗∗ (0.034)
Educationmid 0.454∗∗∗ (0.020) 18.90 0.455∗∗∗ (0.019)
Educationhigh 1.046∗∗∗ (0.023) 47.12 1.043∗∗∗ (0.023)
Dutch 0.131∗∗ (0.051) 5.58 0.123∗∗ (0.050)
Surface per inhabitant -0.023∗∗ (0.010) -0.98 -0.018∗∗∗ (0.007)
Rho -0.067∗∗∗ (0.012) 0
Log L -42,547 -42,532
Observations 16,758 16,758
1. Marginal eﬀects in %-point change of base value for Part (20.83%) and
% change of base value for Income (24.8 thousand euro). Quadratic and linear
eﬀect of age are combined in one marginal eﬀect.
Coeﬃcients with */**/*** are significant at the 10%/5%/1% level.
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Figure 1: Marginal eﬀects of Income equation for Participation case (% of average income)
Second, system estimation yields eﬀects comparable to those from single-equation estimation. In
the following we discuss in detail the structural coeﬃcients of the socio-economic variables.
The eﬀects of socio-economic control variables on income are in general as expected (see Panel B in
Tables 5 and 6). Income increases with the level of education and the age profile has an inverted
U-shape (with a peak at 46 and 44 years, respectively).23 Households with a male breadwinner
have higher income levels (only significant in Table 5). Larger households have a lower level of
income, although there is some indication that households with children under 12 have more.
Households with one adult have less income than households with two grown-ups without children
(remember that our endogenous variable is household income). Finally, there is some indication
that Dutch households have more income than non-Dutch households and that households living
in more densely populated areas have higher incomes.
The marginal eﬀects on income are modest for most variables, except for single-adult households
23 In all tables, the coeﬃcient of Age2 is multiplied by 1000 for a better scaling.
17
Page 17 of 26
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Ca
tho
lic
Ge
ref
orm
eer
d
Isl
am
Ot
her
 re
lig
ion Ag
e
Ma
le
Siz
e h
ou
seh
old
Ch
ild
 <4
y
Ch
ild
 4-
12
y
Ch
ild
 12
-18
y
Sin
gle
 ad
ult
Du
tch
Ed
uc
ati
on
 lo
w
Ed
uc
ati
on
 m
id
Ed
uc
ati
on
 hi
gh
Su
rfa
ce 
per
 in
ha
bit
an
t
Structural Reduced Single
Figure 2: Marginal eﬀects of Participation equation (%)
and education level. According to Table 6, single-adult households have 46% less income than
households with two grown-ups, while a high education level increases income by 47%.
More interesting are the eﬀects of socio-economic variables on the religious variables (see Panel A
in Tables 5 and 6). While Roman Catholic households have a lower religious participation than
Reformed households (-9%: see Table 6), the ‘Gereformeerden’ and other church members show a
higher religious participation (30% and 32%, respectively). In contrast, Barro and McCleary (2003)
find a higher church attendance for the Roman Catholics than for Protestants, while Sawkins et al.
(1997) also find that Catholics have the highest attendance level in Great Britain. The situation
in the Netherlands seems to be diﬀerent from that in other countries. This stresses the point that
the dominance of empirical studies based on data for Canada and the USA might be misleading.
Furthermore, it questions the soundness of cross-country estimations such as that of Barro and
McCleary (2003), as members of the same religion might behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent countries.
The relation between age and religious variables is U-shaped, but this eﬀect is only significant for
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the single-equation estimations. The negative eﬀect of children is larger for households with young
children as the coeﬃcients for the Child dummies are significantly negative (except for Child<4 years
in Table 6). Sawkins et al. (1997) find a comparable pattern for Great Britain. However, this
conflicts with the results of Barro and McCleary (2003) as they find a positive eﬀect for the share
of population younger than 15 on church attendance and an insignificant eﬀect for the share of
people older than 65.
The size of the household has positive eﬀects: larger households are more often members of a church
and they also have greater religious participation. These eﬀects are, however, reduced when young
children are present. The marginal eﬀects on church membership in Table 5 show that the net
eﬀect, when we increase the household size with one and assume that this increase stems from an
extra child, is even negative when the youngest child is between 4 and 18 years old. Single-adult
households do not attend services more often, nor are they more frequently church members (the
coeﬃcients for this variable are not significantly diﬀerent from zero).
None of the education dummies has a significant eﬀect on membership or participation. Barro and
McCleary (2003) find that higher education levels lead to higher levels of religious belief and more
church attendance. Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) argue that households with higher education more
often choose to leave the church, but also intensify their religious behavior when they decide to
stay. Sawkins et al. (1997) find also a positive eﬀect of education on church attendance. However,
we do not find this pattern for the Netherlands. Dutch households are less often members of a
church (note that the marginal eﬀect is -23%), although Dutch members attend services as often
as non-Dutch members. Finally, households living in less densely populated areas participate more
and are also more often members of a church.
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V Conclusions
This paper focuses on the estimation of the eﬀect of religion on income, using a large micro-dataset
for the Netherlands. Religion is captured by two measures: church membership and attendance.
We find that the estimates of the cross-eﬀects following the single-equation approach diﬀer greatly
from the ones obtained from the more eﬃcient system approach.
When religion is measured by membership, we find with the single-equation approach that mem-
bership reduces the income level significantly and that income has a negative eﬀect on membership.
However, both coeﬃcients become insignificant under simultaneous estimation. The bicausal re-
lation is also rejected when religion is measured by church attendance (for the subset of church
members). In contrast, the eﬀects of the socio-economic characteristics on religion and income
hardly diﬀer between the estimation approaches.
The conclusion that religion does not aﬀect income, when properly estimated, might be specific
for the Dutch situation. For future research we plan to investigate, using micro-datasets, whether
the impact of religious behavior diﬀers between countries.
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Appendix A System estimation24
The probability that y1i = 1 and y2i = j for observation i is given by
Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = j) = Pr(y∗1i > 0, μj−1 < y
∗
2i ≤ μj)
= Pr(v1i > −β¯
0
1xi, μj−1 − β¯
0
2xi < v2i ≤ μj − β¯
0
2xi)
= Pr(v1i > −β¯
0
1xi, v2i ≤ μj − β¯
0
2xi)−
Pr(v1i > −β¯
0
1xi, v2i ≤ μj−1 − β¯
0
2xi)
= Φ2(β¯
0
1xi, μj − β¯
0
2xi, −ρ)− Φ2(β¯
0
1xi, μj−1 − β¯
0
2xi, −ρ) (A.1)
where Φ2(a, b, ρ) is the cumulative unit bivariate normal distribution with correlation coeﬃcient ρ
evaluated at cutoﬀ points a and b. Notice that for the two outside classes (j = 1 or j = J), the
expression simplifies to
Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = 1) = Φ2(β¯
0
1xi, μ1 − β¯
0
2xi, −ρ)
Pr(y1i = 1, y2i = J) = Φ(β¯
0
1xi)− Φ2(β¯
0
1xi, μJ−1 − β¯
0
2xi, −ρ)
where Φ denotes the univariate standard normal cdf. Analogously, the probability that y1i = 0
and y2i = j is given by
Pr(y1i = 0, y2i = j) = Φ2(−β¯
0
1xi, μj − β¯
0
2xi, ρ)− Φ2(−β¯
0
1xi, μj−1 − β¯
0
2xi, ρ) (A.2)
The log likelihood function over all observations is obtained by combining the logarithms of the
probabilities (A.1) and (A.2):
24This appendix is based on Hall et al. (2000, Appendix B), Greene (1997) and Maddala (1983).
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lnL =
NX
i=1
JX
j=1
{I(y1i = 1, y2i = j) lnPr(y1i = 1, y2i = j) + I(y1i = 0, y2i = j) lnPr(y1i = 0, y2i = j)}
(A.3)
where I indicates a dummy variable that equals 1 when observation i matches the combination of
y1 and y2. Maximizing (A.3) gives the estimates of the structural coeﬃcients (αk, βk), the cutoﬀ
points (μj) and the correlation (ρ).
Notice that in the special case with ρ = 0, the bivariate system separates into the binary Probit
and the ordered Probit since Φ2(a, b, 0) = Φ(a)Φ(b). The log likelihood (A.3) simplifies to the sum
of the log likelihood functions of the single equations.
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Appendix B List of variables
Income (decile) Decile of household income (deciles based on equal number of
households in the population per class)
Membership Dummy = 1 for membership of a church
MemberCatholic Dummy = 1 for membership of Roman Catholic church
MemberReformed Dummy = 1 for membership of Reformed church
MemberGereformeerd Dummy = 1 for membership of ‘Gereformeerde’ church
MemberIslam Dummy = 1 for membership of Islam
MemberOther Dummy = 1 for membership of some other church
Part Dummy = 1 if service is attended once or more per week
Age Age of breadwinner
Male Dummy with value = 1 if breadwinner is male
Household size Number of persons in household
Child<4 years Dummy = 1 when youngest child is between 0 and 4
Child4−12 years Dummy = 1 when youngest child is between 4 and 12
Child12−18 years Dummy = 1 when youngest child is between 12 and 18
Single-adult household Household has only one grown-up
Educationlow Breadwinner has education at junior general secondary level
Educationmid Breadwinner has education at senior or pre-university general
secondary level or at vocational secondary level
Educationhigh Breadwinner has education at higher professional or university level
Dutch Breadwinner has Dutch nationality
Surface per inhabitant Ordered variable based on area of municipality per inhabitant
(1 = high density (city), 5 = low density (sparsely populated
country village))
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